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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 41 WINTER 1990 NUMBER 2
CLEMENT FURMAN HAYNSWORTH, JR.
- IN MEMORIAM
DONALD RUSSELL*
I have had the good fortune to know three generations of Hayn-
sworths, all outstanding leaders at the bar and models of personal in-
tegrity. My earliest contact was with the grandfather of Clement F.
Haynsworth, Jr., H.J. Haynsworth. H.J. Haynsworth was without
doubt the premier attorney on the civil side in this area and our state's
pioneer in corporate law. He was also the senior partner in the largest
South Carolina law firm at the time. My first federal court experience
was with Mr. Haynsworth as my adversary. Alone and overawed by the
great reputation of Mr. Haynsworth, I anticipated the hearing before
Judge Hitt Watkins in Anderson, South Carolina, with much appre-
hension, if not downright fright. Imagine my amazement when Mr.
Haynsworth called me to invite me to ride over from Greenville to An-
derson for the hearing. I naturally accepted. From that point on Mr.
Haynsworth displayed toward me that consideration, courtesy and
thoughtfulness that I was later to experience in my association with his
grandson. It was a great experience for a young fledgling lawyer to be
treated without condescension and with the utmost courtesy and con-.
sideration by the leader of the bar. The original Clement Furman
Haynsworth, the father of the late judge, carried on that same leader-
ship. But it was with the grandson, Clement Furman Haynsworth, Jr.,
that the family blossomed into national prominence and it was with
him that I had the most intimate personal and professional association.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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Born in Greenville, South Carolina, Judge Haynsworth was edu-
cated in the local schools. He enrolled and graduated from Furman
University, a relatively small but highly regarded academic institution
that bore the name of his ancestor on his maternal side. After gradua-
tion from Furman University, Judge Haynsworth attended Harvard
Law School. He joined the family firm in 1937 upon graduation from
Harvard. His legal career was interrupted, however, by World War II,
in which he served as an officer of the United States Navy. Upon his
return from the war, two events combined to add a new zest to life for
Clement. First, the significant growth in the Greenville area provided
him the opportunity to demonstrate his superlative legal talents and to
acquire a deserved reputation for wise counsel, outstanding legal judg-
ment, and strict adherence to the highest standards of ethical conduct.
Second, and of even greater significance, his marriage brought to him
the serene personal happiness that enabled him to achieve the national
distinction he later attained. The love of Clement and his wife Dorothy
was an inspiration for all who knew them. For forty-three years their
life together was one in which they shared hopes, aspirations, heart-
aches, and disappointments, always with unfailing courage and devo-
tion. During those years, they accepted their many honors with
humility; they met adversity fortified by justified confidence in their
own high purpose and rectitude.
Clement achieved a signal success at the bar, but it was as a jurist
that he is nationally esteemed and respected. He was beyond question
a brilliant jurist of the highest integrity and capacity. For some thirty-
odd years he sat as a member of the Federal Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. During much of that time he was the Chief Judge of the Cir-
cuit. As a judge, Clement had a unique ability to pierce quickly and
accurately to the heart of an appeal and to focus attention both for
counsel and for the court on the genuine issues posed in a case. In oral
argument he sought to aid counsel by directing them to the critical
issues in the case and to divert them from futile arguments over unim-
portant matters. This habit of his contributed immeasurably to facili-
tating the effectiveness of arguments of counsel and the deliberations
of the court itself. It was his custom, in conference after oral argument
with his judicial colleagues, to listen patiently to the views of his co-
panelists and then, at the end, to summarize fairly in a few sentences
the issues and to indicate with great clarity and with judicial detach-
ment his suggested resolution of those issues in the case under review.
He always treated with great respect and consideration, scrupulously
avoiding any touch of condescension, the views expressed by his col-
leagues. As a general rule it was his view that prevailed in conference
because of the power of the compelling logic of his position, as
presented by him.
Judge Haynsworth demonstrated in every case his profound and
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comprehensive mastery of the law and of legal principles. Unlike many
intellectuals, he was a scholar who had the capacity to phrase his ideas
in language of singular simplicity and clarity. It mattered not what the
field of law under consideration, he demonstrated a firm grasp of the
fundamental principles involved. He brought to bear on the issues his
superb powers of analysis coupled with the singular ability to articulate
his conclusions in understandable form and without any unnecessary
flourishes of pedantry. As a consequence it was easy to read Judge
Haynsworth's opinions, but more important, it was easy to grasp and
understand his reasoning and his conclusions.
Judge Haynsworth, though entertaining a deep respect for tradi-
tional legal principles and precedents, recognized that those principles
had to be given a flexibility consonant with the volatile changes in
modern society. In many notable opinions he showed in a remarkable
degree his ability to judiciously adapt traditional legal rules to such
changing conditions without sacrificing the underlying values in which
such rules were rooted. This ability was illustrated by his opinions in
United States v. West' and United States v. Garner.' In these cases,
the admissibility of sworn grand jury testimony of a witness who had
since died under questionable circumstances and therefore was not
available at trial (West), or who had become unwilling to testify con-
trary to the advice of his counsel (Garner), was in issue. The defend-
ants argued that admissibility of the testimony was violative of both
the long-established hearsay rule and the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment. Judge Haynsworth painstakingly examined the evi-
dence and concluded that the record provided sufficient evidence of
trustworthiness and reliability to justify an exception to the hearsay
rule and to satisfy the confrontation clause. This ruling has now be-
come the standard practice when dealing with this type of question.
Nowhere was this attempt to adapt ancient procedures to modern
conditions more evident than in Judge Haynsworth's decisions on the
rights of convicted persons to utilize habeas corpus as a vehicle to chal-
lenge on constitutional grounds their convictions. In a series of deci-
sions, of which Rowe v. Peyton3 is the prototype, Judge Haynsworth
first traced with considerable care the development of the "Great
Writ" and the record "of judicial innovation and adaptation" by which
the Writ had been fitted to meet "new situations and newly felt
needs."'4 He concluded that the remedy of habeas corpus was not then
1. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
2. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
3. 383 F.2d 709, 716-17 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
4. Id. at 715-16.
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"'and never ha[d] been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy' , to "be
restricted to the need of a much earlier time."6 He added that courts
"would be untrue to [their] judicial inheritance if [they] dealt ungener-
ously with rights still affected by the vestiges of technical limitations
applied in an earlier era to common law pleadings."7 He took note of
the constricting rule enunciated in McNally v. Hill,' which denied any
remedy against a sentence not yet fully served, and the gloss put on
that case in the subsequent cases of Jones v. Cunningham9 and Foy v.
Noia.10 Judge Haynsworth reasoned that Jones and Noia had adopted
a view "thoroughly inconsistent with the narrowly technical one of Mc-
Nally." He concluded that, while "[t]his Court, of course, must follow
the Supreme Court,. . . there are occasional situations in which subse-
quent Supreme Court opinions have so eroded an older case, without
explicitly overruling it, as to warrant a subordinate court in pursuing
what it conceives to be a clearly defined new lead from the Supreme
Court to a conclusion inconsistent with an older Supreme Court
case.' 2 Accordingly, he extended the reach of the "Great Writ" be-
yond the earlier limits of the remedy as heretofore envisioned by Mc-
Nally, by providing relief from the future impact of unconstitutionally
defective sentences in proper cases. The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari and let stand Judge Haynsworth's opinion, in effect overruling Mc-
Nally. This opinion is the basis on which the current state of habeas
corpus decisions rests.
One of the most troublesome constitutional questions in current
times arises out of the conflict between the first amendment and the
prior restraint on publication of classified public information, the dis-
closure of which is contrary to the public interest and to regulations
adopted pursuant to legislative authorization. Judge Haynsworth con-
fronted this issue in United States v. Marchetti13 and the related cases
of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby14 and Colby v. Halperin."" In these
opinions, Judge Haynsworth reviewed the prior rulings on first amend-
ment restraints and took note of the power and interest of the govern-
5. Id. at 716 (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).
6. Id. at 717.
7. Id.
8. 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
9. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
10. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
11. Rowe, 383 F.2d at 714.
12. Id.
13. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
14. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 908, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975).
15. 656 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1981).
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ment itself to protect sensitive governmental information involving na-
tional security and interests. Responding to the question of whether
the government is entitled to an injunction establishing prior restraints
upon the publication of "secret information touching upon the national
defense and the conduct of foreign affairs [when that information was
acquired by a person] while in a position of trust and confidence and
contractually bound to respect it ... ."e Judge Haynsworth answered
affirmatively in an opinion of great force, supported as it was by con-
sideration of the greatest public interest.17 Marchetti stands as the
controlling case on this important issue of constitutional law. Judge
Haynsworth, in Heine v. Raus,18 again was called on to address an im-
portant constitutional question that has gained prominence currently:
executive privilege and state secrets. He articulated standards for the
establishment of such privileges which have been generally affirmed.
The decisions reflect Judge Haynsworth's ability to deal thought-
fully and correctly with constitutional issues. As I wrote in an earlier
article some years before Clement's death:
Judge Haynsworth's constitutional opinions demonstrate the Supreme
Court's great loss when he was not confirmed as an Associate Justice.
The denial of confirmation was a shocking injustice, unfairly imposed
upon a jurist of the highest ability and of unblemished character, on
the basis of spurious charges. Anyone who [as I have] has ever been
associated with Judge Haynsworth would attest to his unswerving
sense of propriety, his absolute impartiality, and his invariable adher-
ence to the highest standards of honor and integrity. But in a way this
unfortunate experience was Judge Haynsworth's finest hour. It was an
experience that could have been expected to have embittered one less
strong. As if to confound those who had opposed his confirmation, he
demonstrated by his demeanor in these trying circumstances and by
his continued deportment as a judge and as a man his true qualities of
character and integrity. In so doing, he justified anew the high regard
and affection his friends have for him and earned the respect and es-
teem of all'who honor character and love justice.19
It is of interest that many of the senators who opposed his confirma-
tion have publicly expressed their regret and have expressed their ad-
miration for Judge Haynsworth's legal talents and their confidence in
the purity of his motives.
I have specially noted only a few constitutional decisions of Judge
Haynsworth. But during his judicial career he wrote hundreds of deci-
16. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1313.
17. See generally id. at 1313-1318.
18. 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
19. Russell, Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 307, 310-11
(1982).
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sions in every field of the law. All attested to his broad scholarship, his
discerning command of the precedents, his signal capacity for careful
logical analysis and his abiding interest in fairness and justice. No one
has better described these qualities than his friend, the accepted con-
stitutional and federal procedure authority, Professor Charles Alan
Wright, who wrote, commenting on Judge Haynsworth's record in the
cases in which he wrote the Fourth Circuit's opinions:
To read these cases is to see a great judge at work, and to gain a
better understanding of the qualities that make for judicial greatness.
Here is a judge who understands that judges of inferior courts must
apply the law as the Supreme Court has given it to them, though they
need not be mechanically bound to old Supreme Court doctrines if
there is good reason to believe that those do not represent what the
Supreme Court would do today. Here is a judge who understands that
the courts must apply the choices Congress has made as Congress in-
tended. Here is a caring judge, one who is concerned about the liti-
gants who appear before him and whether what is done to them is
fair. Here is a judge with a powerful analytical mind and the ability to
explain his reasoning in clear and powerful words. Here is a judge who
fairly describes and overcomes the obstacles in his path, rather than
winning the game the easy way by sweeping the opposing pieces off
the table.20
Clement Haynsworth, Jr. was a representative of the best as a man
and jurist. Every person who knew him well was enriched by his gra-
ciousness, his thoughtfulness of others, his freedom from bitterness
(though he had just cause to be bitter), and the purity of his motives
and character. There will always be an empty spot reserved in the
hearts of those who were favored to live and labor with him on the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. That is particularly true of me.
20. Wright, Foreword to CLEMENT FURMAN HAYNSWORTH, JR.-SELECTED OPINIONS:
1957-1987 at viii-ix (1987).
[Vol. 41
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss2/3
